

WHY AND HOW WE GIVE AND ASK FOR REASONS

PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES

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THE DEFAULT TO TRUTH: ON THE TOPOLOGY OF ASSERTION

Dave Beisecker (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Our conversational practices prioritize truth. Free-standing utterances of statements are typically understood as *assertions* – and so understood to be normed to truth, knowledge, or warranted belief. But why is this so natural? Why do we think it would be so absurd to have a *sprachspiel* in which free-standing utterances are instead understood to be *denials*, and so normed to falsity or warranted *disbelief*? As I will show, from the perspective of formal logic, there is no reason to favor one way of speaking over the other. Valid sequents in a system that prioritizes truth (and truth-preserving rules of inference) can also be shown to be such in an equivalent system that prioritizes falsity (and falsity-preserving rules of inference). So we will have to look elsewhere to find out why we have such a predilection for speaking truly. Instead, I will draw upon a line of reasoning initiated by Peirce, who argued that the reason he took his logical diagrams or *graphs* to be scribed on a sheet of assertion is that assertion, but not denial, distributes into conjunctions. Following Peirce, I will suggest that the reason why we overwhelmingly favor assertion over denial (and truth over falsity) similarly might come down to a topological feature of the spoken medium: our spoken utterances don't neatly sort themselves out into discrete talk or thought boxes, as they would if we lived in a comic-book world.

REASONING, REASON RELATIONS, AND SEMANTIC CONTENT

Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)

I sketch an order of explanation that moves from pragmatics to semantics. The most basic use of linguistic expressions is to perform speech acts of assertion and denial, manifesting doxastic attitudes of accepting and rejecting. What makes the practical attitudes *doxastic* attitudes is their standing liability to *challenges* by assertions that provide reasons *against* them, and the consequent obligation to *defend* them by assertions that provide reasons *for* them. Those practices make intelligible reason relations of implication and incompatibility, which (by adapting Ryan Simonelli's version of bilateralism) can be understood in terms of normative statuses of *commitment* to accept and reject and (preclusion of) *entitlement* to such commitments. The second stage of the envisaged pragmatics-first order of explanation then

semantically characterizes the claimable contents expressed by the declarative sentences that are asserted or denied, what can be doxastically accepted or rejected, in terms of the functional roles those sentences play in reason relations of implication and incompatibility. Dan Kaplan's substructural implicational phase-space semantics shows in detail how an expressively powerful formal semantics can be elaborated from the material relations of implication and incompatibility that precipitate out of the functionalist story told in such a normative pragmatic metavocabulary. An exciting recent result of Ulf Hlobil's shows that Kit Fine's truthmaker semantics stands in surprising relations to the normative pragmatics gestured at here, and I build on that result to show that it also stands in surprising relations to Kaplan's inferentialist semantics.

POST-TRUTH LAUGHTER AND THE SPACE OF REASONS

Elizabeth Cantalamessa (University of Miami)

Abstract: In this project, I draw on Robert Brandom's inferentialism and Richard Rorty's "anti-authoritarian" sentimentalism to argue that humor operates as a distinctly "meta-normative" social practice. Roughly, humor is a means by which community-members can collectively acknowledge and appreciate incongruities that follow from the norms that govern what they do without impairing the social relations that ground the practice itself (e.g., acknowledging someone as an authority or expert). Empirical work suggests that humor is based in innate computational processes in the brain and a child's sense of humor arises from the same social-cognitive capacities for discerning and tracking others' attitudes. Humorous performances are publicly-meaningful but are not necessarily treated as a reflection of a jokester's commitment to things being "thus-and-so." The content and thus permissibility of a joke is not reducible to reason-based justifications - humor is not primarily in the business of describing what is true. However, we can still use humor to refer to actual stuff in the world, and we often hold each other accountable for what we do (or do not) find funny. Humor, both depends on and operates "outside" the discursive norms that govern a community, and an inferentialist account of humor suggests that laughter is a product of the social-perspectival conditions that enable the very possibility of publicly-meaningful performances in the first place. Laughter is a collective achievement that extends beyond the space of reasons because successful humor is ultimately a matter of trust. One can always find a comedy club in the downtown of language.

FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONING AS A DISCURSIVE PRACTICE: THE PRIMACY OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Marco Fenici (Independent Scholar)

How do we predict others' behaviour? A traditional view assumes we do it by reasoning about others' mental states. Action prediction, within this view, requires *folk psychological*

reasoning (FPR), that is, a mechanical procedure taking the mental states of the agent in input to logically infer, or deduce, the anticipated action.

Philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Sellars have however argued that FPR actually depends on the discursive practice of rationalizing a behaviour *after* it occurred. In the talk, I will defend such a discursive view. In particular, I will propose that discursive FPR has evolved because (i) by reporting (our) mental states, we take a public responsibility to conform our future behaviour to specific patterns of action, and (ii) tracking such pragmatic commitments plays a fundamental role in supporting action coordination.

The proposal vindicates the promising idea that folk psychology has a regulatory function (Mameli, 2001; McGeer, 2007; Morton, 2003; Zawidzki, 2013), but is also open to embed such a thesis within a more radical socio-cultural framework (Fenici & Zawidzki, 2020; Kusch, 1997). Mental states are cultural artefacts, instituted and preserved only through the socially rehearsed performance of conventional, inter-subjectively defensible and justifiable linguistic practices.

I will conclude by elaborating the consequences of this view in the field of developmental psychology. Opposing nativist (Baillargeon et al., 2016; Carruthers, 2013; Csibra & Gergely, 2014; Leslie, 2005), and empirical approaches (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1996; Heyes, 2018; Wellman, 1990), I will argue that FPR is at its core a linguistic capacity, that is acquired by the child in her attempt to make sense of the social and linguistic environment (Bruner, 1990; Hutto, 2008). Children acquire the capacity to reason about the mind from the social environment by mastering the pragmatic conditions in which it is felicitous to ascribe a mental state to themselves or to another agent (Fenici, 2017, 2020).

TELEO-INFERENTIALISM

Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University)

The paper presents teleo-inferentialism, which is a novel meta-semantic theory that combines advantages of teleosemantics and normative inferentialism. Like normative inferentialism, teleo-inferentialism holds that contents are individuated by the norms that govern inferences in which they occur. This allows teleo-inferentialism to account for sophisticated concepts. Like teleosemantics, teleo-inferentialism explains conceptual norms in a naturalistically acceptable way by appeal to the broadly biological well-functioning of our innate capacities. As a test-case for teleo-inferentialism, I discuss how the view handles Kripkenstein-style meaning skepticism.

THE EVOLUTION OR HISTORY OF „WHY“? NEITHER, AND BOTH!

Michal Hubálek (University of Hradec Králové)

More than a decade ago, Daniel Dennett accused Robert Brandom of undertaking “an unacceptable flight from naturalism” (Dennett 2010, p. 60) by not paying close attention to

evolutionary theories while theorizing about human rationality. I consider this an unjust accusation, which is a symptom of the many difficulties that contemporary thinkers still face in their attempts to digest the notion of naturalism within philosophy. Thus, I take Dennett's argument(s) as a steppingstone to argue that what I shall call *the questions of origin* represents a specific set of questions/explanations that deserve subtler examination with respect to various relevant isms (e.g., naturalism, inferentialism, pragmatism, post-positivism). In my talk, I am going to focus on how the evolutionary attempts to explain the origin of human rationality relate to the explanations of what rationality is, especially when rationality is conceived in normative terms.

ADDITIVE TRANSFORMATIVE RATIONALITY

Yannick Kohl (University of Luxembourg)

Whenever we ask what makes humans different from animals, our rationality seems to be a good place to start. But how much different are we from non-rational animals? Matthew Boyle (2016, 2012) discusses and criticises the view that humans are animals with some cognitive upgrades. According to such additive theories of rationality, rationality is a capacity that is added to or sits on top of older non-reflective capacities. Boyle advocates a transformative view of rationality.

Firstly, I want to disambiguate different criteria for transformation and additivity. I will differentiate between diachronic, a synchronic empirical and a synchronic conceptual perspectives. Then I will argue that with several plausible criteria transformative and additive aspects of rationality are not mutually exclusive. Secondly, I want to build on Boyle's synchronic conceptual transformativism and discuss it in terms of analytic functionalism. Rational capacities give perception and desire new causal roles. If perception and desire of rational animals are embedded in different functional systems, this explains why the terms have different meanings. This view, while being weaker than Boyle's transformativism, offers a more fine-grained understanding of the criteria for differentiating transformative and additive accounts.

REASON-GIVING AS MAINTENANCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE COMMONS

Jeremy Koons (Georgetown University - Qatar)

Many programs in social epistemology – which reject the individualistic assumptions of much traditional epistemology – hold that our practice of belief-regulation should be evaluated chiefly by how it promotes narrowly epistemic goals (e.g., truth, or justified belief, or knowledge). However, promotion of narrowly epistemic goals cannot be the only function of a healthy epistemic practice. Human community – indeed, rational agency itself – cannot exist without a vast store of common ground: shared background beliefs about norms and institutions, but also factual beliefs about the shared world we inhabit. Given this, it follows that a central function of any society's epistemic practice must be doxastic coordination – i.e., the production of consensus sufficient to enable community, communication, and coordination.

This conclusion impacts how we understand various elements of our epistemic practice. For example, we must understand that a central function of giving and asking for reasons is to re-establish consensus sufficient for cooperation, when such consensus has broken down. Philosophical considerations of the sort just offered support this conception of the function of reason-giving and -taking; further, this conception is also supported by empirical research into the evolution of reasoning and how reasoning works in early human development. My thesis supports the work of researchers like Mercier and Sperber, who argue against “the intellectualist view that reason evolved to help individuals draw better inferences, acquire greater knowledge, and make better decisions” (2017, p. 182), and argue that reason-giving serves a primarily social function. I claim that this social function is doxastic coordination.

FUNCTIONS AND NORMS OF REASONING

Ladislav Koreň (University of Hradec Králové)

Two traditional questions about human reasoning concern what it takes to reason as human beings do, and what it takes to reason well. Evolutionary approaches have enriched our perspective by exploring how or why reasoning could have evolved. However, a satisfying account of human reasoning in this spirit should say something plausible about why or how humans treat their reasoning as answerable to norms of good reasoning that specifically impose rational desiderata. I shall probe on this score increasingly popular adaptationist accounts of reasoning that put forward three core claims. First, reasoning evolved because it served some fitness increasing function. Second, the form of reasoning fitted to that function was public exchange of reasons, rather than private ratiocination. Third, myside bias promotes good functioning of reasoning in that form, being plausibly explained as its functional-adaptive feature. Proponents of this approach differ, however, when it comes to specifying the main or primary function of public reasoning. Some say it primarily promoted vital social ends; and indirectly also vital rational ends. Others say the reverse is more likely to be true. No matter, I shall argue on a case-by-case basis that each of extant proposals fails to do justice to the normative-rational dimension of reasoning.

THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF GIVING AND ASKING FOR REASONS

Hilary Kornblith (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

When groups engage in cooperative problem solving, they frequently outperform their highest performing members. How is it that they are able to do this? This paper examines the ways in which the social practice of giving and asking for reasons serves to aid in cooperative problem solving despite the fact that private reflection on the epistemic standing of one’s beliefs does not, in general, contribute to greater reliability. Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative approach to reasoning plays a central role in this explanation, and this paper pushes that approach further by showing how a number of social forces operate so as to assure that cooperative problem solving groups, especially in certain formal settings, are well-calibrated.

ONTOGENY OF HUMAN REASONING

Bahar Köymen (University of Manchester)

Recent accounts argue that “reasoning” – in the sense of explicating reasons for actions or conclusions – is a fundamentally social skill enabling partners to produce and evaluate one another’s arguments to reach joint decisions (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Köymen & Tomasello, 2020). In this talk I will present series of studies in which young children produce and evaluate reasons (verbal as well as non-verbal reasons) with partners to reach joint decisions. The findings suggest that children as young as 2- and 3-year-olds are able to reason with others; they get better at reasoning in late preschool ages; and they eventually become very “strategic” reasoners at school ages. Overall, the results support the view that children’s collaborative reasoning is a fundamentally cooperative enterprise aimed at making joint rational decisions.

POWERSCORE AND THE BRANDOM GAME

Alan McDonald (University of Manchester)

How are we to analyse power in the conversational game? I revisit the scorekeeping analogy of David Lewis that is woven into Brandom’s seminal account. Accepting social scientist Susan Fiske’s definition of power as asymmetrical control over resources – in this case, linguistic resources – I argue that we begin any episode of talk with a relative power-‘score’ between interlocutors, of which equality is a particular limiting case. This mutual score is then utilised by the empowered, and sometimes modified, in the course of talk. The process happens within individual speech acts like imperatives, but more broadly in persuasion and coercion over (a series of) speech events. Two areas of complexity are briefly explored: the *displacement* of power, where the effects of talk carry over into subsequent speech events; and the *field of authority* claimed by one interlocutor over others, where for example a teacher claims authority beyond their legitimate realm. The ideas are illustrated by two examples: power voluntarily ceded during medical encounters; and the problems exposed by #metoo and the lesser-known (Scandinavian) #talkaboutit, which are related back to ideas about reciprocity first explored by Jennifer Hornsby in the 1990’s.

COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY: SOCIAL METACOGNITION IN YOUNG CHILDREN

Marlene Meyer (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, presenting), Jan Engelmann (Berkeley University of California), Marina Proft (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen) and Hannes Rakoczy (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

Being able to monitor and verbally reflect on their epistemic states marks a major milestone in young children’s metacognitive development. Interestingly, these skills seem to develop relatively late. Prior research suggests that children are prone to overestimate their knowledge

and thus lack metacognitive insight until they reach school age. Our concern, however, is that these findings may present false negatives. Typically, metacognitive experiments are conducted in an individualistic context – but this may not be the most appropriate setting since it neglects the pivotal link between metacognition and social interaction. Our main research question was whether children may display successful metacognitive insight earlier in when given the opportunity to interact and communicate naturally with another person. Thus, we developed a social paradigm and tested 3- and 5-year-old children. Results confirm the hypothesis that a socially interactive context facilitates children’s ability to acknowledge their ignorance and communicate their uncertainty. This finding suggests that a social experimental context is indeed more appropriate – because of the close relationship between metacognition and the discursive as well as social character of human interaction and cognition.

EPISTEMIC HIGHER-ORDER THINKING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO REASONS IN NON-LINGUISTIC AGENTS

Giacomo Melis (University of Stirling)

Rational agents are capable of forming beliefs in response to reasons. Some philosophers endorse an *unreflective* characterization of responsiveness to reasons, according to which, roughly, a belief may be responsive to reasons when its formation is guided by one’s perceptions and one’s desires. In this picture, non-linguistic agents like non-human animals or very young children may be described as epistemically rational agents.

Other philosophers advocate a *reflective* characterization of responsiveness to reasons, according to which, roughly, a belief may count as rational only when the believing subject understands what her reasons are and can critically evaluate them. Under this characterization, it would seem that only humans who have reached a stage of cognitive development which allows for discursive deliberation may count as epistemically rational agents.

While the unreflective characterization is enough to vindicate a notion of rationality – or, some would say, intelligence – that applies to non-human animals and very young human children, the apparent hiatus that separates it from its reflective counterpart suggest that the rationality of cognitively developed humans differs in kind from that which is available to other species and very young human children. As part of a broader research on the relation between reflective and unreflective epistemic rationality, I will explore the connection between the theory of epistemic defeat and reflective responsiveness to reasons, and suggest it supports a characterization of the latter that may be within the reach of non-linguistic agents.

ACTION AND REASONS-SEEKING QUESTIONS

Lilian O'Brien (University of Helsinki)

It has been widely accepted that intentional action is “... action to which “a certain sense of the question ‘why’ is “given application” (Anscombe, *Intention*, 1957/2000, 9). But there are

strong reasons for thinking that this claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which such questions are unsound, and so, these questions are not “given application” in these cases. Second, when these questions are “given application”, and elicit reasons in a sense that will be clarified, this is best explained by the fact that the agent who acts has exercised certain rational capacities in acting. If the arguments are sound, intentional actions and reasons-seeking questions are not as tightly intertwined as they are often thought to be.

A TRULY, MADLY, DEEPLY SOCIAL THEORY OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Molly O’Rourke-Friel (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Traditionally, epistemologists have characterized reasoning as a private competence. The social enters the epistemological picture when we start exchanging the outputs of that private competence with one another. However, new research concerning our ability to reason puts pressure on this approach. In *The Enigma of Reason*, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber develop and defend an “interactionist account” according to which reasoning is a social competence that yields epistemic benefits for individuals through social interaction with others (2017, 9). This paper explores how epistemologists should incorporate the interactionist account into a theory of doxastic justification. I argue that the epistemological consequence of Mercier and Sperber’s position is an unexplored kind of social epistemic dependence on others. Working on the process reliabilist’s framework, I argue that in light of (1) the plausibility of historical theories of justification and (2) Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, we should posit the existence of extended interactive justification-conferring processes. My central claim is that, in cases where beliefs are formed and sustained by dialogical deliberation, the relevant process that confers justification on a deliberative participant’s belief doesn’t occur solely within the cognition of that particular subject, but rather extends beyond it to include her interactive engagement with other deliberative participants. I argue that a significant consequence of this claim is that not all that is justification-conferring is evidential. As such, my analysis not only supports reconceiving the process reliabilist’s notion of justification-conferring processes, but it also serves as an argument against evidentialism.

GOGAR AND LOGICAL THEORIES

Jaroslav Peregrin (University of Hradec Králové)

There is a clear sense in which logic is a theory of GOGAR – logical laws articulate its principles. But is the exact relationship between logical theory and the practices of giving reasons or drawing inferences? The usual picture is that people play GOGAR and logicians rectify what they do: confirm that some of the inferences are correct while pointing out that others are incorrect. To do this, logicians need some authority, which would underpin their arbitration of what is correct. Where does this authority come from? The usual answer is that it comes from the fact that logical laws bring to light some fixed structures of either human mind or the natural world. What I claim is that the ultimate source of the authority comes

from the practices themselves – viz. from the norms inherent to them, which logic brings to light (and neatens). Thus it is not so that logic rectifies GOGAR on the basis of an authority acquired elsewhere, but rather that logic pinpoints the norms implicit in GOGAR to state the explicit rules of the game.

THE SEVEN HEAVENLY VIRTUES OF TELEOLOGY

Josef Perner (University of Salzburg)

Social Cognition has been dominated by the view that we make sense of each other's behaviour by means of a "theory of mind". The question whether we actually use a theory or rely on simulation has been discussed for some time – without resolution. Based on philosophy of action, *teleology* has more recently been added as a competitor. Its main tenets are that we understand action on the basis of objective facts and objective goals (what needs doing to improve given circumstances). The mental only enters when different perspectives have to be considered: teleology-in-perspective. I discuss its various advantages that become apparent when we need not just predict or explain but justify behaviour. It also predicts a clear separation between straight cases and cases where perspective differences are involved. I present supporting data that this distinction is reflected in development and in brain activity.

INFERENCE AND SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION

Mark Risjord (Emory University), Jared Millson (Rhodes College), and Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College)

Questions of representation have loomed large in recent philosophy of science. The dominant approach seeks a substantive relationship, analogous to truth conditions, between the scientific representation (typically, a model) and what is represented (the target). According to a substantivist approach, any inferences that might be made about the target on the basis of the model – so called "surrogative inferences" – are consequent on securing the representation relation. An inferentialist turns the relationship around, treating a model's capacity to represent the target as a consequence of its inferential role. Expressivist inferentialism in the philosophy of language aims to treat all semantic vocabulary, such as ". . . is true" or ". . . denotes . . .," as expressive of an underlying inferential practice. Presumably, scientific representation should receive the same treatment.

The mainstream of inferentialism in the scientific representation literature builds some variety of denotation into the account. The mainstream thus does not follow through on the full-blown expressivist inferentialist program. Our project aims to fill that lacuna. This presentation will sketch an expressive inferentialist treatment of scientific representation. It will begin by establishing desiderata for an expressivist inferentialism about scientific representation. It will then outline a view that satisfies those desiderata by articulating conditions that justify surrogative inference. On this view "Model *M* represents target *T*" expresses the entitlement to draw surrogative inferences about *T* from *M*. Crucially, the conditions that justify

surrogative inference, what we will call the “inferential pedigree,” make no appeal to denotation or other substantive, representational commitments.

RELOCATING IRREDUCIBILITIES: ON TURNER’S ANTI-NORMATIVISM ON REASONS AND BELIEFS

Pietro Salis (Università di Cagliari)

Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that “reasons” can be understood naturalistically as “the causes of the beliefs of scientists”, and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts can be better understood as Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are “false accounts” that play a role of social coordination, just like magical or religious rituals in primitive societies (e.g. Tabu and the like). According to Turner, “norms”, “obligations”, “reasons”, and “commitments” are just like Tabu, and can be explained away as GBT. Hence, normative accounts are expected to disappear completely in a “fully disenchanting” world.

Turner focuses on the widespread idea that the normative does not reduce to the causal: his main claim is that social science succeeds in the reduction, overcoming the normative/causal dualism. Furthermore, this putative success is understood as creating a serious issue for normativism. However, this way of understanding the irreducibility of the normative, which is pervasive in Turner’s argument, is too narrow and there are, in fact, other irreducibilities in the vicinity that are overlooked in his strategy. By exploring three kinds of irreducibility, and especially by focusing on certain (supposedly normative) features of beliefs like those involved in belief-revision procedures, I will point out some relevant implications and problems in Turner’s argument.

AGENTIVE AND LINGUISTIC NOTIONS OF REJECTION IN THE ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY OF SHARED INTENTIONALITY AND DISCURSIVE COGNITION

Preston Stovall (University of Hradec Králové)

Recent and ongoing research on human reasoning, both in philosophy and in the sciences, foregrounds the social practice of argumentation as a basis for human rationality. The study of modal logic offers bold and interesting predictions for deepening this research.

For instance, because the deontic modalities distinguish a strong and a weak modal force, whereas the individual and shared intentional modalities do not, one must model deontic cognition as a kind of practical rationality that (unlike merely intentional practical cognition) involves binding oneself to a course of action by *rejecting* incompatible alternatives – a practical attitude I call *single-mindedness*. This suggests that the deontic frame of mind is a kind of shared-intentional cognition that is differentiated by a capacity for practical self-government. And studies of the ontogeny of human cognition suggest that our responsiveness to norms

quickly develops out of a capacity for shared intentionality that emerges at the end of the first year of life, and that this rapid development occurs in tandem with a capacity for higher-order executive functioning and self-control.

Turning from model theory to proof theory, this *agentive* notion of rejection (directed at choices) can be compared to the *linguistic* notions of assertion and rejection (directed at propositions or interpreted sentences) advanced in bilateral semantic programs. Doing so raises the following hypothesis: whereas discursive cognition requires a capacity to entertain assertions and linguistic rejections in one act of cognition (as the bilateralist proposes), it is possible that a stage of *non-discursive* but *linguistic* hominid cognition – where acts of linguistic assertion and rejection were always only entertained *separately* in *distinct* acts of cognition – might have preceded the emergence of discursive thought. Discursive cognition is thereby understood as the internalization of the social practice of dialogical argumentation, brought off through the single-minded agentive rejection characteristic of deontic cognition.

NON-PROPOSITIONAL NORMATIVITY AND PERCEPTION: TOWARDS A THREE-PLY THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Jag Williams (Independent Scholar)

In this paper, I aim to analyze and revise Robert Brandom's two-ply theory of perception using recent scholarship in the philosophy of embodiment as a hermeneutical lens. In particular, I argue that the concept of *motivated* normativity developed by philosophers of embodiment, which is neither causal nor rational, problematizes Brandom's two-ply theory of perception because the two-pole categorization of capacities is unable to account for a normative non-propositional mode of perceptual grasping the world. Yet, rather than taking this criticism as a death knell to Brandom's theory, I utilize Brandom's recent discussions of "Desire" and "Recognition" in *A Spirit of Trust* to showcase how his own work problematizes his two-ply theory because neither Desire nor Recognition fits into causal or rational capacities in perception. Then, by building on both the non-propositional normativity criticism from the philosophy of embodiment as well as this internal incongruity in Brandom's work, I argue that Brandom's two-ply theory ought to develop into a three-ply theory of perception by incorporating an additional middle-ply *motivational* capacity between his original causal and rational capacities.

RESPONSIVENESS TO REASONS AND CHANGING ONE'S MIND

Jenny Zhang (University of Edinburgh)

I propose that what is necessary and sufficient for changing one's mind about a moral issue is a) having a new, strong intuition, and b) meta-evaluating one's initial moral judgement and assimilating the new intuition, through appealing to narrative self-understanding. When an individual encounters reasons or arguments that challenge her existing moral intuitions, beliefs, attitudes or judgements, she might experience a new moral intuition. To undergo a

change of mind, she needs to meta-evaluate her existing moral judgement and assimilate the new intuition, in light of her narrative self-understanding. This involves evoking a distinctive understanding of herself, interpreting the new intuition on the basis of her past experiences, and anticipating future experiences given the new intuition and existing narrative self-understanding. Strong opposing reasons or arguments tend to influence this process through a) helping to elicit the new, strong intuition necessary for changing one's mind, or/and b) corresponding to, influencing or becoming part of one's narrative self-understanding. I suggest that simply having a new, strong intuition in response to some reasons or arguments is a pre-reflective form of reason-responsiveness, while meta-evaluating one's initial moral judgement and assimilating the new intuition, by appeal to one's narrative self-understanding, constitutes an explicit, meditated form of reason-responsiveness.